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A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION*
INTRODUGTION
In recent years increasing attention has been focused upon the
issue of a woman's right to exercise control over her body. While this
issue has arisen most visibly in the controversies over abortion laws,
the area of contraception presents equally troublesome conflicts.
The present and future population crisis having been long pre-
dicted,1 the time is ripe for full consideration of all contraceptive al-
ternatives. Yet despite general acceptance of birth control, legal im-
pediments still surround certain contraceptive practices. Voluntary
sterilization is such a method.
It has been estimated that each year 100,000 Americans elect
voluntary sterilization as a method of birth control. Because the
operation is relatively simple, inexpensive, and productive of reli-
able contraceptive results, this number is rising.2 Reexamination of
the legal considerations regarding voluntary sterilization thus seems
timely.
It is crucial at the outset to delineate the concept of voluntary
sterilization as it is used throughout this comment, and to contrast
other types of sterilization which are beyond this comment's scope.
"Voluntary sterilization has come to mean a willing sterilization for
whatever personal reasons for contraception the patient may have."3
This concept is also identified as "elective sterilization."4 In contrast,
sterilization intended to prevent conception for medical reasons
(usually to preserve the health of the woman) is referred to as thera-
*The author wishes to express her indebtedness to Jeremiah S. Gutman, Esq.,
New York, N. Y. whose work provided the inspiration for the development of this topic.
1. See, e.g., T. MALTHUS, ON POPULATION 8-9 (Modern Lib. ed. 1960):
I think I may fairly make two postulata.
First, That food is necessary to the existence of man.
Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain
nearly in its present state.
These two laws, ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind,
appear to have been fixed laws of our nature, and . . . we have no right to
conclude that they will ever cease to be what they now are ....
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence
increases only in an arithmetical ratio.
2. W. CURRAN & D. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 820 (2d
ed. 1970).
3. Wolf, Legal and Psychiatric. Aspects of Voluntary Sterilization, 3 J. FAMILY L.
103-04 (1963). Personal reasons for sterilizations include socioeconomic considerations.
4. See, e.g., Comment, Elective Sterilization, 113 U.-PA. ,L:ARv. 415 ,(1965)....
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peutic sterilization.5 Eugenic sterilization seeks to prevent the trans-
mission of certain undesirable hereditary traits, such as feebleminded-
ness and insanity.6 Some states have, in the past, enacted statutes re-
quiring sterilization as a punishment for sex crimes and certain other
criminal offenses; these statutes have been categorized as punitive
sterilization. 7 The distinctions among the various types of steriliza-
tion have occasionally been ignored in practice. For example, the
statutes of two states use the term "voluntary sterilization" to refer
to "eugenic sterilization."8
Although the principal focus of this comment is on states not
having statutes concerning voluntary sterilization, such as New York,
an understanding of the subject will be enhanced by a look at the
current statutory situation throughout the United States. Only one
state prohibits sterilization except for medical necessity., Four states
specifically provide for voluntary sterilization: Georgia, 10 North Caro-
lina,1 Oregon,' 2 and Virginia.' 3 Forty-five states thus lack prohibiting
5. Wolf, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Overstreet, Legal Aspects, in MANUAL OF FAmILY PLANNING AND CONTRAC.P-
TIVE PRACTICE 398 (M. Calderone ed. 1970).
In recent years several of these laws have been declared unconstitutional on
the grounds that they called for "cruel and unusual punishment." Such statutes
which are still in effect in other states are therefore presumed to be unen-
forceable and obsolete.
Id.
8. See MONT. Rzv. CODEs ANN. § 69-6401 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8701
(1968).
9. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-11 to -12 (1968).
10. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-931 to -935.2 (Supp. 1971). These provisions make a
sterilization lawful when the following conditions are met: operation must be per-
formed by licensed physician, person requesting sterilization must be at least 21 and
'legally married, informed consent of person requesting sterilization and spouse must be
obtained. Compliance with these conditions immunizes physicians from civil and criminal
liability except in cases of negligence. The Georgia provisions do not require any
objecting hospital to admit a patient for sterilization. Without further clarification of
the term "objecting," the Georgia statues would seem to create a situation similar to
that in states in which there are no statutes. The 1971 statutory version has resulted
in confusion of terminology. See id. § 84-933; see also supra, note 8 and accompanying
text.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-271 to -275 (Supp. 1971). Unique features of the
North Carolina law include a mandatory thirty-day waiting period and a provision for
operation on an unmarried minor (which necessitates written consent of minor plus
petition of parents or guardian to juvenile court). A 1971 amendment substituted "18"
for "21" as the standard for ability to independently consent. The North Carolina statute
does have a consultation requirement similar to that of Georgia. It does not, however,
have a nonrequirement section for hospitals.
12. ORE. REv. STAT. § 435.305 (1971) provides: "A person may be sterilized by
appropriate means upon his request and upon the advice of a physician licensed by the
State Board of Medical Examiners."
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or enabling legislation. The ability to deal with voluntary sterilization
problems in a state lacking statutes on the subject should therefore
carry far-reaching implications.
In the absence of a state statute specifically permitting voluntary
sterilization, the decision to allow such procedures has most often
been made by hospital committees. The question arises, then, whether
a woman may challenge the denial of access to a hospital for the per-
formance of a voluntarily sterilization after her physician has consid-
ered her personal reasons and her medical history and has agreed to
perform the operation. It is posited that a woman has a fundamental
right to choose voluntary sterilization as an alternative method of con-
traception. While this operation will rarely be chosen as the contra-
ceptive method of first choice, its availability in cases of reasonable
personal and medical considerations should not be impaired.
I. MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ATTITUDES
Recognized individual motives for voluntary sterilization in-
clude failure rates of other contraceptive measures; inconvenience of
contraceptives resulting in failure to employ them properly; and side
effects of birth control pills.14 Statistics and factors in the failure of older
birth control methods (rhythm, condom, intravaginal chemical con-
traception, diaphragm) have received attention in the medical litera-
ture.' 5 Intrauterine devices (IUDs) with low failure rates may none-
theless be undesirable, due to complications ranging from mild cramps
and bleeding to uterine perforation. 6 Although the birth control pill
is the most desirable of contraceptive methods when judged on the
basis of failure rate, extensive research has revealed side effects and
contraindications to use.1 As a result of problems with other means
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-423 to -427 (1969). Virginia's statute is substantially
like that of North Carolina.
14. Comment, supra note 4, at 417.
15. See generally MANUAL OF FAMILY PLANNING AND CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE
(M. Calderone ed. 1970).
16. See Hall, Clinical Aspects, in MANUAL OF FAMILY PLANNING AND CONTRACEP-
TIVE PRACTICE 331 (M. Calderone ed. 1970); Schwartz & Markowitz, Serious Sequelae
of Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices, 211 J.A.M.A. 959 (1970); Tietze, Contraception
with Intrauterine Devices, 96 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 1043 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Beckman, Complications of the Contraceptive Pill, 69 WIs. MED. J.
84 (1970); Garcia, Clinical Aspects of Oral Hormonal Contraception, in MANUAL OF
FAMILY PLANNING AND CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE 283 (M. Calderone ed. 1970); Gutt-
macher, The Influence of Fertility Control Upon Psychiatric Illness, 115 Am. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 683 (1959).
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of birth control, it is therefore felt that permanent surgical steriliza-
tion, rather than temporary fertility control, is desirable for a portion
of the female population.'8
Psychologically, the resulting benefits of a voluntary sterilization
may be enormous. A positive retreat from anxiety may be enjoyed
as a result of the procedure.' 9 In fact,
[v]oluntary sterilization can and does contribute to mental health;
by helping to keep the population increase in line with developing
resources; by reducing the anxiety caused by fear of unwanted preg-
nancies; by preventing children from being born to irresponsible
parents with resultant neglect and social ills . . . . All this can be
accomplished without unfavorable psychological effects and with
a high ratio of satisfaction.
20
An often-urged reason against female voluntary sterilization is
that male sterilization is preferable. Yet, women are better adjusted
psychologically to sterilization operations than are men.21 This factor
should receive recognition in formulating standards for access to
sterilization operations.
18. Bopp & Hall, Indications for Surgical Sterilization, 35 OBST. & GYNEC. 760
(1970); Elstein, Sterilization and Family Planning, 205 PRACTITIONER 30, 34 (1970):
Sterilization should be considered for a couple who are experiencing
difficulties with the existing methods of contraception.
. . . In these instances, particularly when the couple consider that their
family is complete, sterilization is a boon and a release from much tension
and inconvenience.
19. DeLee, Voluntary Sterilization, 54 INT. SURG. 304, 308-09 (1970). The author
draws an "exact parallel" between a country bogged down by a too-rapidly growing
population and a family burdened with the same pressures. "The same stresses and
unhappiness occur within the family unit as within an overcrowded country when this
occurs." Id.
20. Laidlaw & Bass, Voluntary Sterilization as It Relates to Mental Health, 120
Am. J. PSYCHI ,RY 1176, 1179 (1964).
21. Forbes, Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18 Da. PAUL L. REv.
560, 561 (1969).
[Mien are often emotionally unstrung by the surgery. Confusing fertility,
virility and masculinity, otherwise indolent husbands feel compelled to lift
weights, wear crew cuts, jog, and flex their muscles to demonstrate their
equality with men who can still impregnate their wives.
Women, on the other hand, are much more sensible from a psychological
point of view. They do not usually confuse the feminine role with reproductive
capacity after they have given birth to a number of children.
Id. See also, J. FA-WC-TT, PSYCHOLOGY AND POPULATION 57 (1970).
A psychiatric consultation requirement has been suggested when the patient is too
young, has few children or has had psychiatric problems, prior to voluntary sterilization.
See Wolf, supra note 3, at 123. While such a consultation may be indicated in certain
cases, the individual's private physician should be equipped to recognize those cases
that warrant psychiatric referral. This would seem particularly true in light of the
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Surgical methods of female sterilization have become increasingly
simple and safe.22 Choice of a method of sterilization will depend on a
number of factors.23 Meanwhile, the demand for voluntary steriliza-
tion may be underestimated. A 1964 study24 showed that 8 percent of
women who had reached the age of 40 had been rendered infertile;
4 percent by necessary gynecological operations, and 4 percent by de-
liberate sterilization. The "necessity" of some of the gynecological
surgery appeared questionable.
2 5
A consideration of the policy statements of nationally organized
groups of physicians regarding voluntary sterilization is valuable in
that these statements tend to reflect the contemporary thought of the
medical profession's mainstream.26 Most hospital policies today fol-
low the guidelines of the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists (A.C.O.G.) .27 Although the guidelines have recently been
increasing emphasis on, and awareness of, behavioral sciences in the medical school
curriculum.
22. See, e.g., Overstreet, Female Sterilization, in MANUAL OF FAMILY PLANNING
AND CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE 404 (M. Calderone ed. 1970); Guttmacher, supra note
17, at 684.
23. See Overstreet, supra note 22, at 413-15 which lists the relevant factors: (1)
the patient's age; (2) her general medical status; (3) her wishes and those of her
husband; (4) whether the procedure is puerperal or interval; (5) the dependability
(low failure rate) and complexity (concurrent and post sterilization risks); (6) the
gravity of indications for sterilization; (7) whether sterilization of the husband is
perhaps preferable and whether it can be depended upon; (8) whether delivery is
abdominal or vaginal; (9) the presence or absence of pelvic, especially uterine, disease;
(10) whether pelvic surgery is otherwise gynecologically indicated; and (11) type of
anesthesia. It has been suggested that women in a high-risk group for future gynecologic
disease (carcinoma of the cervix, in particular) might be better served were hysterectomy
chosen as a method of sterilization rather than tubal ligation. See Haynes & Wolf, Tubal
Sterilization in an Indigent Population, 106 Am. J. OBsT. & GYNEC. 1044 (1970).
24. Cited in Overstreet, Permanent Contraception: Sterilization General Considera-
tions, in MANUAL OF FAmILY PLANNING AND CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE 389-90 (M.
Calderone ed. 1970). "The 'necessity' of many of the [gynecological operations] is often
principally the desire for contraceptive sterilization." Id. The above finding raises the
possibility that reasons of dubious medical necessity are being used to circumvent re-
strictive hospital sterilization committees.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 390.
27. Id. at 391. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists used to
have the following criteria for voluntary sterilization:
Sterilization is permissible in any woman 25 years of age, who has or
will have five living children at the termination of the present pregnancy.
Also, any woman 30 years of age, who has or will have four living children
at the termination of this pregnancy. Also, any woman 35 years of age, who has
or will have three living children.
Id. at 392-93.
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liberalized, 28 the residual influence of medical traditions is reflected
in the perpetuation of the customary age-parity formula which re-
stricts voluntary sterilizations to older women or to young women with
many children. 29 A fair appraisal of the widespread use of age-parity
formulas suggests that they are entrenched more by custom than by en-
lightened scientific knowledge.80
Aside from medical evidence and peer group pressures, fear of
legal consequences, whether real or imagined, may have resulted in
restrictive regulations regarding voluntary sterilization. It thus seems
important to explicate the potential criminal and civil liability of the
physician arising out of sterilization operations, with an emphasis on
the majority of states in which there is no voluntary sterilization
statute.31
The only possibly relevant provisions of general criminal law
are those concerning mayhem and assault and battery.8 2 According to
one court, "[t]he concept of mayhem at common law was forcibly
and violently depriving another of the use of such members of the
body as might render him less able to defend himself, or to annoy his
adversary. '3 3 The applicability of a definition of mayhem so general
as to include injury to women through sterilization has been dis-
claimed.34 The inclusion of voluntary sterilization under assault and
battery has also been rejected.35
The American Medical Association's Law Department has stated
that voluntary sterilization, "until declared illegal by the legislature
or the courts in the physician's State, is largely a matter of individual
28. Id. at 393. The 1969 A.C.O.G. Standards of Obstetric-Gynecologic Hospital
Services requires only that "each hospital must establish its own regulations concerning
sterilization." Id.
29. Id.
30. In general, a situation which will, in all probability, further the health,
happiness, and opportunity for any family, especially where other methods of
contraception have failed or are considered undesirable, may be considered a
justifiable indication.
White, Tubal Sterilization, 95 Aml. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 31, 36 (1966).
31. Where such a statute exists, procedures in accordance with the terms of the
statute exculpate the physician from civil and criminal liability. See discussion in supra
notes 10-13.
32. Mackay & Edey, The Law Concerning Voluntary Sterilization as It Affects
Doctors, 103 J. UROLOOY 482 (1970).
33. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 313, 53 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1949) (em-
phasis added).
34. See Mackay & Edey, supra note 32; cf. Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 173,
174-75, 255 N.W. 620, 621-22 (1934).
35. Bravenec, Voluntary Sterilization as a Crime: Applicability of Assault and
Battery and of Mayhem, 6 J. FAmiLY L. 94 (1966).
COMMENTS
conscience and principle."3 6 One commentator has made the astute
observation that sex laws which make "sins" into "crimes" "are com-
pletely at variance with the realities, and even the ethics, of our
lives today."3 7 Notwithstanding the misleading treatment of physician
involvement with contraception as a subtopic under Criminal Law in
legal research volumes,3 8 the physician's fear of criminal consequences
in states without relevant prohibitory legislation3 9 is imaginary.
With regard to civil liability of physicians, it should be stressed
that a sterilization operation requires no greater justification than do
other surgical procedures.40 The physician is subject to liability for
negligence4 1 and for failure to obtain an informed consent from the
patient and spouse.42 Employment of generally accepted legal stand-
ards of professional health care will vitiate civil liability for voluntary
sterilization operations.
II. THE COMPETING INTERESTS: HOSPITAL REGULATIONS V. THE
RIGHT TO (MARITAL) PRIVACY
It may be worthwhile at this juncture to consider the competing
interests of hospital-formulated policies and the personal right of
choice regarding contraceptive method. As one commentator has
noted: "Even in states with enabling legislation, there is a danger that
the availability of voluntary sterilization might be limited by restric-
tive hospital regulations. '43 In most hospitals, the doctor whose pa-
36. DeLee, supra note 19, at 306.
37. Pilpel, Sex vs. the Law, 23 J.A.M.W.A. 179, 184 (1968).
38. See Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control in the
United States, in POPULATION, EVOLUTION AND BmTH CONTROL 244 (G. Hardin ed.
1964) ; see, e.g., 12 Amr. JUR. 2d 367 (referring the reader interested in researching
sterilization to Criminal Law volume); but cf. 35 A.L.R.3d 1441 (annotation on legality
of voluntary nontherapeutic sterilization).
39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. Note, Sterilization and Family Planning: The Physician's Civil Liability, 56
GEo. L.J. 976, 995 (1968).
41. Custadio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (court upheld damages from failure of sterilization resulting in birth
of a normal child); see Comment, Malpractice-Sterilization Operation, 70 W. VA. L.
Rnv. 242, 248-49 (1968). But see Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964),
holding that failure of sterilization resulting in birth of a child would not serve as a
basis for damages in the absence of a post-operative fertility testing standard in the
community.
42. Miller & Dean, Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations, 16 A.B.A.J.
158, 160-61 (1930); see Moore & Vickery, Voluntary Sterilization Recommended Forms,
59 J.M.A. GA. 374, 375 (1970) which discusses the "reasonable medical explanation"
requirement of the Georgia statute.
43. Tiernez, Voluntary Sterilization. A Necessary Alternative?, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 373,
384 (1970).
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tient desires a sterilization operation must submit a request to the
sterilization committee. The latter is usually a combined therapeutic
abortion-sterilization committee, an arrangement which unfortunately
confuses the moral problems of the two procedures.44 It has been
documented that'requests based on socioeconomic considerations take
longer to pass through the sterilization committees than requests based
on medical considerations. 45 However, experts argue that socioeco-
nomic indications should be sufficient to justify sterilizations.
The mere expression of desire by a concerned couple to have one
of them sterilized should be heeded and respected by the physician.
This feeling, when based upon sound thinking, can be reason enough
to abide by the request, though upon probing, one can almost always
elicit some logical psychological or other reason for this request.
46
Concern over the population explosion makes a more liberal approach
appropriate. 47 Moreover, it is even dubious whether generally accepted
moral standards are opposed to voluntary sterilization. 48 The most
promising recognition of socioeconomic indications as a reasonable
basis for voluntary sterilization is the recent United States district
court memorandum opinion in a woman's suit against a hospital for
injunctive and declaratory relief. Damages were granted for the re-
fusal to permit her doctor to perform a voluntary sterilization and the
defendant hospital's motion for summary judgment was denied.40
44. Forbes, supra note 21, at 562. Although one would suspect that such joint
committees are now defunct in New York State by virtue of the new liberalized abortion
law, it is safe to assume that medical traditions including underlying morals die slowly.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also Hardin, Censorship Within the
Medical Profession, in POPULATION, EVOLUTION AND BIRTH CONTROL 242 (G. Hardin
ed. 1964) which contains a memorable line: "I wish it could be said that the medical
profession was uniformly in the vanguard of the progression toward dignity in human
reproduction-but, of course, it was not." Id. For an example of one such committee,
see generally Savel & Perlmutter, Therapeutic Abortion and Sterilization Committee, 80
Am. J. OBST. & GYNEc. 1192 (1960).
45. See Savel & Perlmutter, supra note 44.
46. DeLee, supra note 19, at 306.
47. White, supra note 30. See Lockhart, Surgical Control of Population, 66 TVuxAs
MED. 24 (1970) who advances the following problems as directly related to population
excess: poverty, crime, violence and pollution.
48. Bravenec, supra note 35, at 110.
49. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D. Ore., Jul. 22, 1971)
which reads in part:
[Plaintiff] contends that the hospital's committee on sterilization made a
value choice involving moral and religious considerations.
- In each case when surgery was not recommended, the minutes disclose
that the patient desired the operation for socioeconomic rather than medical
reasons. The meaning of these social and economic considerations involves a
question of fact. A trial is necessary.
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A fundamental right to voluntary sterilization derives from a
right to personal privacy as formulated in Griswold v. Connecticut.0
The Griswold decision offers a due process prototype to oppose the
authority of a hospital to formulate its own regulations. A possible
equal protection argument will be treated later in this comment.51 In
Griswold, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League
of Connecticut and its medical director, a licensed physician, were
convicted as accessories for giving married persons contraceptive in-
formation in violation of the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute.
52
The Connecticut statute was held to infringe upon the right of marital
privacy, and the Connecticut court decision upholding the statute's
constitutionality was reversed.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, first held that appellants,
the clinic director and physicians, had standing to raise the constitu-
tional rights of married people with whom they had a professional
relationship. 53 Douglas then spoke of the spirit of the first amendment
as encompasing the right infringed.54 He based his holding on a
theory of penumbras created by the Bill of Rights by analogy to the
first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. 55 Finally, in recog-
nizing a right of marital privacy, 56 Douglas' opinion for the Court ex-
panded the content of rights within the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.57
In a concurring opinion5 Justice Goldberg argued that it is a
violation of the ninth amendment to contravene an unenumerated
fundamental right.59 However, one authority has noted that this theory
is not supported by historical analogy.60 An important feature of the
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
52. 381 U.S. at 480.
53. Id. at 481.
54. Id. at 482.
55. Id. at 483. Douglas' opinion has been viewed favorably because it is grounded
in analogy justified by texts of the first eight amendments, and is thus opposed to
arbitrariness in method. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487, 490 (1966).
56. 381 U.S. at 486; see Franklin, supra note 55, at 490.
57. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219
(1965).
58. 381 U.S. at 485-92.
59. Id. at 490. See the Goldberg formulation of the ninth amendment argument,
id. at 485-92; see generally Emerson, supra note 57.
60. See Franklin, supra note 55, at 489. The author states that Goldberg's legal
method is arbitrary because the sources of determination may be entirely subjective and
secretive.
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Goldberg opinion is his emphasis on the state's failure to establish an
overriding state interest in the area of birth control."'
Justice Harlan filed a concurring opinion which is notable for
its clarity and simplicity. The main thrust of the Harlan opinion is
that the incorporation doctrine may not be used to restrict the reach of
the fourteenth amendment. "The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
0 2
The classic enunciation of the right to individual privacy was
formulated by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead
v. United States:63 "[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."0 4
Although such a comprehensive definition of the right has yet to be
adopted,65 the Griswold decision does expand privacy rights in the area
of birth control. The case has been read by at least one judge as a
broad command to protect the privacy and intimacy of family life.00
It seems critical that "the Court tied marital privacy and access to in-
formation together into a single bundle of rights. 0 7 Increasingly, the
individual and social interest in marital and family security by means
of contraception is being recognized.68 Future judicial developments
61. Although the Connecticut birth-control law obviously enroaches upon
a fundamental personal liberty, the state does note show that the law serves
any "subordinating [state] interest which is compelling" or that it is "necessary
... to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
381 U.S. at 497-98. It is the author's opinion that this facet of the Goldberg opinion
will have greater significance than his ninth amendment analysis.
62. 381 U.S. at 500. Harlan relies in part on the selective incorporation doctrine
of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) wherein the test posed is "that liberty
is something more than exemption from physical restraint, and that even in the field
of substantive rights and duties the legislative judgment, if oppressive and arbitrary
may be overridden by the courts." Id. at 327.
63. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
64. Id. at 478. This extension of the scope of the fourth amendment has been
suggested as an aftermath of Griswold. See note 65 infra.
65. Griswold led to the suggestion that interpretation of fourth amendment rights
should not be confined to criminal law and extends into the area of personal privacy.
See Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy,
26 REcopD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 546, 557 (1971).
66. Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1234-35
(E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion), appeal docketed, No. 70-42 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970).
The Supreme Court has been viewed as sympathetic to a constitutional right to privacy
regarding family life. See Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to
Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. Rxv. 979, 988; see also Bravenec, supra note 35, at 124.
67. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law
of Privacy?, 64 MIcH. L. RFv. 197, 214 (1965).
68. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MicH. L. Rv.
259, 278-82 (1965).
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may be influenced by such empirical evidence as the new definition of
the right to individual privacy which has emerged as a result of an
intensive study.69
While the fundamental right to (marital) privacy is not absolute,
the state must show a compelling interest to infringe upon it.70 One
judge has written, "[G]overnmental regulation of marital intimacy
.. .seriously threatens the institution of marriage and... such gov-
ernmental action is invalid unless there is great justification for it."71
Following this line of reasoning, a Texas court recognized certain pos-
sible state interests concerning a widely debated right of personal
autonomy, the right to abortion.72 However, the court granted declara-
tory relief from the unconstitutionally vague and overbroad Texas
abortion statute, stating that such "legislation ... must address itself
to more than a bare negation of that right."
7 3
In addition to cases strengthening the factual holding of Griswold,
a series of abortion cases have expanded the decision by analogy. 74
The California Supreme Court in People v. Belous7r reversed a phy-
sician's conviction under the former "medical necessity only" Cali-
fornia abortion statute and called the right involved in abortion "the
woman's right to life ... because childbirth involves risks of death."76
The court found the nonenumeration of this right in either the
United States or California Constitutions to be no impediment to its
existence.77 The District of Columbia abortion statute case, decided
69. "[The right to individual privacy is] the right of the individual to decide for
himself, with only extraordinary exceptions in the interests of society, when and on
what terms his acts should be revealed to the general public." Westin, Science, Privacy,
and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1003, 1031 (1966).
70. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Hufstedler, supra note 65,
at 562.
71. Hufstedler, supra note 65, at 559.
72. The following state interests were recognized: (1) interest of state in seeing
abortions performed by competent persons; (2) state interest in seeing abortions per.
formed in adequate surroundings; (3) concern over the "quickened fetus." Note, 2
TExAs TEcHr. L. Rav. 99, 103 (1970).
73. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1970), appeal docketed,
No. 70-18, U.S. Oct. 6, 1970, juris. postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971). Due to the
lack of Supreme Court clarification on the constitutionality of abortion laws, decisions
in the state courts have varied. Hopefully this area will be clarified in the near future
since the Supreme Court has docketed appeals on cases involving abortion laws. See
notes 75-83 infra and accompanying text.
74. Discussion of the abortion cases also seems appropriate in light of the wide-
spread practice of joint sterilization-abortion hospital committees. See supra note 45
and accompanying text.
75. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
76. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
77. Id., 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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at about the same time,78 found the right as part of a right to privacy
and postulated that such a right "may well include the right to remove
an unwanted child at least in early stages of pregnancy." 79 A federal
district court in Wisconsin spoke of the "medical necessity" abortion
statute in that state as an unconstitutional invasion of a woman's
right to refuse to carry an unquickened embryo.8 0 In addition, a sub-
stantial constitutional question was found on the right to abortion in
a challenge to the Georgia statute."' In those cases in which the state
abortion statute has been totally or substantially upheld, a woman's
fundamental right to determine whether to bear children before
pregnancy has nevertheless been recognized.8 2 Thus, since Griswold,
courts have finally come to realize that a woman's right to control her
own reproductive organs is of fundamental importance to her."0
Griswold has also received support from recent cases involving
contraception laws. For example, in Baird v. Eisenstadt,s4 which in-
volved an anti-contraceptive display law, the court held that the statute
was in conflict with fundamental human rights. In People v. Baird,5
a statute which prohibited the sale of contraceptives except by physi-
cians was upheld, the court deferring to the legislature for change in
this area. These two cases may be readily distinguished on the ground
78. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
79. Id. at 1035.
80. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 402 U.S. 903 (1971); accord, Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-18, U.S. Oct. 6, 1970, juris. postponed, 402 U.S. 941
(1971).
Declaring that a woman must be free to decide whether she will bear a
child, a panel of three Federal judges . . . declared unconstitutional Con-
necticut's statutes prohibting elective abortion.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
81. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-40,
U.S. Nov. 14, 1970, juris. postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971).
82. Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C.1971), appeal docketed, No.
71-92, U.S. July 17, 1971; Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318
F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970). Both cases explicitly refer to sterilization as a means
toward the end of exercising a right to choose not to bear children before women
become pregnant.
83. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730, 776 (1968).
84. 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970), afj'd, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took notice that the statute in
question was drafted with what the legislature believed to be "the precise accommoda-
tion necessary to escape the Griswold ruling." 429 F.2d at 1401. See Note, 84 HARV. L.
Rxv. 1525, 1529-33 (1971). See also notes 127-28 infra and accompanying text.
85. 47 Misc. 2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County, 1965).
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that the court found a demonstrable state interest in the latter, but
not in the former.8 6
Since voluntary sterilization is a recognized method of birth con-
trol, it falls squarely within the protection of the Griswold decision.
This proposition has been accepted by one California court which up-
held the legal validity of voluntary sterilization.8 7 A recent federal de-
cision, McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center,8 8 clearly implies
that a hospital's refusal to permit a woman to be sterilized, which was
based upon an age-parity formula, invaded her right to privacy in her
marital relationship. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that plaintiff's claim for damages under the Civil Rights statute
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) was not rendered moot by the fact that the hos-
pital granted the sterilization procedure subsequent to the commence-
ment of plaintiff's action.8 9 The court further held that federal juris-
diction was properly invoked 9° and that plaintiff's possible claim for
malpractice in the state courts did not justify invoking the doctrine of
abstention.91 In reversing the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's
claim, the court specifically delineated the right to privacy in the
marital relationship as one of the issues to be considered on remand.92
However, the Court of Appeals stated that the plaintiff's claim for
damages "is clearly based upon invasion of a right of 'personal
liberty' . ... 9
86. The interest of the state in seeing that contraceptives sold to its citizens meet
certain health standards and are fitted properly seems to bear reasonable relation to the
exception of physicians from the prohibition. The antidisplay statute can only be justified
on a "contraceptives are immoral per se" rationale. However, the new Supreme Court
decision in Eisenstadt implies that the state can only prohibit laymen from dispensing
contraceptives that involve some health hazard. See 405 U.S. at 452-55.
87. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1969). California does not have a statute allowing voluntary sterilization. It
was stated in the decision of the court:
[T]here is no legislative policy or any other overriding public policy
proscribing consensual vasectomy in this state . . . . [I]t is an acceptable
method of family planning, while Griswold indicates that it may fall within
constitutional protection.
Id. at 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
88. 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
89. Id. at 701-02.
90. Id. at 703-04.
91. Id. at 704.
92. Id. at 701.
93. Id. at 702.
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III. PREPARING A LEGAL ATTACK WHERE No STATUTE PROHIBITING
VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION EXISTS AND HOSPITAL REGULATIONS
ARE RsSTRiCTiVE
For the woman with substantial financial means, a process of doc-
tor-and-hospital shopping 4 might not constitute a substantial burden.
However, if the possibility of voluntary sterilization is not to be ex-
tinguished for the many women who would find the burden of this
process prohibitive, access to public hospitals becomes crucial. Thus, a
legal framework is necessary to protect the fundamental right to choose
voluntary sterilization as an alternative means of contraception. A
two-pronged attack is proposed: (1) finding a hospital of sufficiently
public character to obtain jurisdiction under civil rights statutes; and
(2) raising an equal protection argument when a hospital purports to
offer medical services for those unable to afford them, yet refuses a
reasonable request for a voluntary sterilization.
A. Obtaining Jurisdiction
The virtual abolition of sovereign immunity has resulted in state
hospital administrative officials becoming liable to suit for an injunc-
tion and/or damages under federal civil rights statutes.95 Private/pub-
lic hospital distinctions have been waning as "private" hospitals taking
federal Hill-Burton monies9" have been deemed vulnerable to suit on
federal question grounds97 The necessary degree of state involvement
present to raise a federal question as a result of participation in the
Hill-Burton programs has been held to include "massive use of public
funds and extensive state-federal sharing in the common plan" as
94. Due to the fact that a physician is usually allowed to operate only at those
hospitals at which he holds staff privileges, finding a doctor who will perform a voluntary
sterilization is only a minor step toward having the operation. If the hospital refuses
the doctor permission to perform the operation, the woman must find a new doctor with
different hospital affiliations. The number of women financially able to bear the costs
of voluntary sterilization are substantially reduced by the Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans
which do not pay for such an operation. See Ass'n for Voluntary Sterilization, Inc.,
note 111 infra and accompanying text.
95. See Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966); see also notes 108 and
109 infra.
96. Construction and Modernization of Hospitals and Other Medical Facilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1970).
97. Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp., 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969), Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
938 (1964). See also, Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D. Ore.,
Jul. 22, 1971).
'I COMMENTS~ :'
relevant factors. 98 Since it has been estimated that -some -35 percent 6f
the general hospital beds in the United States were -constructed with
Hill-Burton monies, 99 it is evident that this is a potentially far-reaching
ground in the strategy of challenging hospital action...
I. The majority opinion in McCabe illustrates the kinds of condi:
ions that tend to support a finding of "color of state action" in- cases
involving hospitals.a ° The character of the defendant hospital as. "a
tommunity hospital funded by certain public funds,"'01 - along -with
the - pr6bability that some employees were paid from public funds,
was sufficient to meet the requirements of. section 1983,102 at least to
the extent of withstanding a motion to dismiss. 10 3 The defendanthos-
pital's argument that there was no section 1983 jurisdiction bec'ause
the hospital "merely rendered 'a discretionary decision' as physi-
cians,"10 4 was rejected by the court:
Of course, few decisions of doctors or administrators in a public
hospital will provide a proper basis for a section 1983 action
because such decisions do not usually affect rights secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States .... Where medical
treatment of a patient in a public hospital is alleged to be the basis
of an invasion of a recognized constitutional right, some other highly,
unusual factor would seem necessary. 10 5
The- court went on to find such an "unusual factor" 'regarding the e-
fendant hospital's refusal to sterilize plaintiff:
ITfatrefusa1] -as based not on medical factors peculiar to -her 'ase
jut on an arbitrary age-parity formula. In effect, according to plain-
tiff,, this rule is as constitutionally odius as a rule prohibiting volun-
tary,'sterilization of blacks. Plaintiff argues that through use of the
age-parity rule defendants violated her constitutional 'rights by at-
tempting to decide for her that she must subject herself to the pos-
sibility of pregnancy, despite the risk to her health, and by attempting
to decide how many children she and her husband should have and,
by what means they may prevent conception. 0 6
98. Simkins v: Moses.H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963).
99. National Legal Program on Health Problems of the Poor; Proposal for Refund-
ing, 1971-72 at 3.
100. 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971); see also supra notes 89-94 -add accompanying
text.
101. 453 F.2d at 703.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see note 108 infra.
103. 453 F.2d at 703.
104. Id. at 702.
"105. Id. at 704.
106. Id.
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Once the necessary state action is found, the applicable federal civil
rights statutes may be invoked. The content of relevant federal statutes,
42 U.S.C. § 1983107 and 28 U.S.C. § 134318 has been clarified by judi-
cial declarations. A cause of action has been held to lie for conspiracy to
violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983.109 Aside from the Hill-Burton "color of state
action" route, it seems possible that the requisite authority might be
found in state public health or hospital laws. For example, the New
York Public Health Law contains a sweeping statement of policy and
purpose,110 which might be read to confer "color of state action" on all
hospital practices implementing state policies.
B. Equal Protection Issues
Statistics on payments for voluntary sterilization indicate that
even persons not usually considered "poor" may have great difficulty
financing the operation."' The Blue Cross plans of seventeen states
would not pay for sterilizations motivated by socioeconomic factors; of
the state Blue Shield plans, nineteen would not pay. Medicaid would
pay for voluntary sterilizations in thirty-three states, as well as in the
District of Columbia. As a result of the refusal of many health insur-
ance plans, as well as certain Medicaid programs, to pay for voluntary
sterilizations, the number of women to be classified as "poor" increases.
Thus, an equal protection argument becomes a concrete one, because
"[v]oluntary sterilization is a method of birth control which should be
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). The civil rights and elective franchise statute
confers original jurisdiction on federal district courts and provides for remedies of
damages or equitable or other relief.
109. Birnbaumv. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
110. N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW § 2800 (McKinney 1971) provides:
[T1he department of health shall have the central, comprehensive re-
sponsibility for the development and administration of the state's policy with
respect to hospital and related services, and all public and private institutions,
whether state, county, municipal, incorporated or not incorporated, serving
principally as facilities for the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of human
disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition or for the rendering of
health-related service shall be subject to the provisions of this article.
111. Ass'n for Voluntary Sterilization, Inc., 1969 Survey of Blue Cross-Blue Shield
and Medicaid Payments for Voluntary Sterilization, in MANUAL OF FAMILY PLANNNG
AND CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE 422-23 (M. Calderone ed. 1970).
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available to all, rich or poor, who wish no more children." 112 This
argument is strengthened by the development of the "new" equal pro-
tection, in which economic inequalities have been a major area of
controversy.11a Griffin v. Illinois"4 and Douglas v. California"l5 expand
the constitutional dimensions of economic inequalities beyond formerly
well-established areas, such as voting." 6 Statutes imposing jail terms
on persons unable to pay fines have also been held to be violative of
equal protection."17
Courts have also been receptive to this argument in regard to
abortion statutes. It has been said that a practice of not informing
ward patients of their legal right to abortion while making such a serv-
ice more available to the wealthier patients creates an unconstitutional
inequality.118 In City of New York v. Wyman" 9 the lower court held
that "the effect of the State's refusal to provide Medicaid reimburse-
ments is to deny the poor ... the benefits of [the liberalized abortion
law] solely because of their indigency."' 20 It was explicit that such a re-
sult would violate the equal protection clause.' 2 ' The Appellate Divi-
sion for the First Department affirmed 22 In a four to three decision
the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mere fact that the indi-
gent cannot pay for elective abortions does not place a constitutional
mandate upon the state to supply the service.' 23 Judge Gibson's dis-
sent,124 in which Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Bergan concurred, em-
112. Pilpel, Birth Control and a New Birth of Freedom, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 679, 682
(1966).
113. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1159-90 (1969). There is a wide range of situations
in which discriminatory state action has been identified. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967).
114. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (refusal to afford appellate review solely because of
inability to pay for transcript of trial is denial of equal protection).
115. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (establishing right of indigent to counsel on appeal in
state criminal case).
116. See G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1019 (8th ed. 1970).
117. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970).
118. Lucas, supra note 83, at 772-73.
119. 66 Misc. 2d 402, 321, N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 700,
322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't. 1971), rev'd, 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 1B0, 330 N.Y.S.2d
385 (1972).
120. 66 Misc. 2d at 415, 321 N.Y.S. 2d at 709.
121. Id. at 420-22, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 713-15.
122. 37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (lst Dep't. 1971).
123. 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972).
124. Id. at 538, 281 N.E.2d at 181, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
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phhsized the legislative intent of the liberalized -abortion law was 'to
"reduce discrimination against the poor.' 125
Notwithstanding the Wyman case, expansion of the dimensions
for application of the equal protection clause has continued. In Eisen-
stadt v. Baird126 the Supreme Court recently held that a Massachusetts
,statute permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent
pregnancy but prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single per-
sons violates equal protection.22 7 In reference to sterilization, a federal
court has held that a plaintiff's complaint should not be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds without providing her with the opportunity
to offer proof that arbitrary age-parity rules of the defendant hospital
violated her equal protection rights. 28 As Professor Michelman has
'stated, "[i]t is no justification for deprivation of a fundamental right
(i.e., involuntary nonfulfillment of a just want) that the deprivation
results from a general practice of requiring persons to pay for what
-they get." 29 It has been suggested elsewhere that compared to due
process, equal protection is a superior justification for the invalidation
of actions or regulations infringing upon unenumerated fundamental
rights.2 0
CONCLUSION
The- absence of statutes in the majority of states on the subject of
voluntary sterilization has resulted in a general climate of restrictive-
ness through hospital regulations. This is perhaps not a fair appraisal
,of -the situation in states with statutes which expressly allow voluntary
.sterilization.13' Yet, one of the purposes of this comment has been to
show that nonexistent, or at best limited, admissions to hospitals for
voluntary female sterilizations may be challenged before legislative en-
lightenment occurs. The woman, choosing voluntary sterilization as a
125. Id. at 540i.281 N.E.2d at 182,-330 N.Y.S.2d at 388..
126. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
127. "If, under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible." Id. at 453.
128., McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d.698, 704 (2d Cir. 1971);
"see'especially supra )ote 94 and accompanying text.
129. Michelman, supra note 114, at 27.
130. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 113,
at 1131.
131. See Tiernez, supra 'note 43, at 365 n.62, Nwho notesthat the University of
Virginia hospital recently 'discarded age-parity ratios, bringing their reglations in line
with the Virginia statute.
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means of birth control has a fundamental right to such a choice and to
the resources necessary for her physician to implement this decision.
A recent study of students and faculty at Cornell University indi-
cated that the consequences of sterilization are not generally under-
stood. 132 Since community attitudes seem to have some influence as far
as hospital committees are concerned, one might presume that greater
dissemination of health education materials will have a liberalizing
effect on hospital policies. The increasing public awareness of health
and health care alternatives has led to demands for greater responsive-
ness of health systems. The mere fact that a particular legislature has
not addressed itself to voluntary sterilization in no way negates such a
choice as of right. Hospital regulations implementing a restrictive
policy may be found to be within "color of state action" and subject
to challenge when they infringe upon a woman's right to choose a
contraceptive method without proving an overriding state interest.
The disparity between the degree of access to hospitals enjoyed by the
wealthy in contrast with that of the poor who wish to obtain a volun-
tary sterilization may be attacked by an equal protection argument. It
is time for Griswold to stand for a woman's right to all contraceptive
choices.
SusAN L. BLOOM
132. See Eisner, Population Control, Sterilization, and Ignorance, 167 SCIENCm 337
(1970).

